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"Some Measure" of Protection: Due Process
in the Balance in Grmenholtz
In this note, the author examines the recent decision of
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional
Complex, in which the Supreme Court of the United States
apparently dispensed with a balancing approach in deciding
how much process was due in parole release determinations.
Setting the case in the context of the sometimes inconsistent
language in decisions on administrativedue process of the last
ten years, the author concludes that the Burger Court seems
to be edging back uncertainly toward the old, restrictive view
of due process based on a distinction between rights and
privileges.
So often in the past decade has the Supreme Court of the
United States tried to articulate a standard for due process in
administrative contexts that one commentator has characterized the Court's recent attempts as a "due process explosion,",
and the results have been both widely felt and sometimes unpredictable. Ostensibly, the general approach of the Court subjects
a due process claim to two stages of analysis.' The Court first
scrutinizes the private interest at stake, derived from common
law, constitution or statute, to determine whether the claimant
has been deprived of a liberty or property interest within the
meaning of the due process clause. This step is a qualitative,
definitional test. If the asserted interest is constitutionally protectible, the Court then applies a quantitative test, weighing the
individual's interest against the interest of the state (e.g., in administrative convenience and economy) to find the amount of
process due in the circumstances. 3 In practice, when a state has
economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare
[T]he Constitution
assistance programs are not the business of this Court ....
does not empower this Court to second-guess state officials charged with the
difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients.
397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to state allocation of welfare funds); see Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. at 495; Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S.
535, 551 (1972) (quoting above passage); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483,
489 (1955); Rios v. Dillman, 499 F.2d 329, 335 (5th Cir. 1974).
1. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1268 (1974).
2. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
263 (1970); Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
3. The Court refined this balancing approach in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
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granted a property right, the Court refuses to find any constitutionally protected interest outside of that expressly created by
the statute.' On occasion, the Court has evinced a willingness to
apply the same restrictive analysis to liberty interests allegedly
created by the state, such as "good-time credits" for prisoners' or
an inmate's "right" not to be transferred from a medium- to a
maximum-security prison.' And in delineating the scope of due
process in Nebraska parole release determinations, 7 the Court recently demonstrated a similar willingness to manipulate the sec•ond half of the due process analysis, tipping the balance against
a full measure of constitutional protection.
Inmates of the Nebraska prison system brought a class action against the Nebraska Board of Parole, claiming that the
procedures employed in granting or denying parole deprived
them of due process of law. The Board set up a two-stage hearing process.8 The first stage was an informal hearing at which the
inmate appeared before the Board after it reviewed his pre- and
post-confinement record. Although the Board conducted what
was essentially an interview, the inmate could present statements or letters in support of his claim for release. If parole was
denied at this stage, the Board informed the inmate of its reasons; any inmate found to be "a likely candidate for release," 9
received a second, more formal hearing. 0 Notice of the month in
which this second hearing was to be held was given shortly after
the preliminary hearing, and the exact day and time were posted
on a bulletin board the day of the hearing. If the Board denied
parole at this stage, the inmate received a written statement of
(1976), setting forth three factors to be considered:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function in-

volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Id. at 335.
4. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
5. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974).
6. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225-26 (1976).
7. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Cor. Complex, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2106-08
(1979).
8. The procedures used by the Board were derived partly from statute and partly
from the Board's practice. 99 S. Ct. at 2102.
9. Id.
10. At this stage, the inmate might present evidence, call witnesses and be represented by counsel, but he was not permitted to hear adverse testimony or cross-examine
adverse witnesses. The entire proceeding was tape-recorded. Id.
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the reasons for the denial. The United States District Court for
the District of Nebraska agreed with the inmates that these procedures did not satisfy due process, and the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit affirmed." On certiorari, the Supreme Court
of the United States held, reversed: The mere existence of a parole system does not create for prisoners a constitutionally protectible liberty interest; although the particular language of the
Nebraska parole statute does create a legitimate expectation of
parole entitled to some constitutional protection, the procedures
currently employed by the Nebraska Parole Board provide all
the process that is due. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska
Penal & Correctional Complex, 99 S. Ct. 2100 (1979).
The impact of Greenholtz is not confined to parole decisions.
The full significance of this case emerges only when placed in the
context of the recent line of due process decisions, each expressing a standard colored by its peculiar facts as well as by judicial
pronouncements derived from other administrative contexts.
Thus, the conflicting opinions in Greenholtz reflect the confusion
in that larger development.
As the seventies began, the Court was still expanding the
scope of due process. The landmark case of Goldberg v. Kelly,"2
for example, went far toward judicializing the process required
before termination of welfare benefits. In rejecting the old disItinction between "rights" and "privileges,"' 3 the Court held that
11. In finding that the Board's procedures did not adequately protect the inmates'
"'conditional liberty' interest," the district court had prescribed specific additional procedural safeguards required by the Constitution. The court of appeals found that there
was also a "statutorily defined, protectible interest" but "modified the procedures required by the District Court as follows:"
(a) When eligible for parole each inmate must receive a full formal
hearing;
(b) the inmate is to receive written notice of the precise time of the
hearing reasonably in advance of the hearing, setting forth the factors which
may be considered by the Board in reaching its decision;
(c) subject only to security considerations, the inmate may appear in
person before the Board and present docurfientary evidence in his own behalf.
Except in unusual circumstances, however, the inmate has no right to call
witnesses in his own behalf;
(d) a record of the proceedings, capable of being reduced to writing,
must be maintained; and
(e) within a reasonable time after the hearing, the Board must submit a
full explanation, in writing, of the facts relied upon and reasons for the
Board's action denying parole.
Id. at 2103 (paraphrasing Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Cor. Complex v. Greenholtz, 576
F.2d 1274, 1285 (1978)).
12. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
13. Id. at 262. In older case law, whether due process protections were required de-
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welfare benefits were "a matter of statutory entitlement" whose
termination involved state action adjudicating important private
rights. 4 Thus procedural protections were necessary. The
amount of process due was to be determined by "the extent to
which [the recipient might] be 'condemned to suffer grievous
loss,' " depending "upon whether the recipient's interest in
avoiding that loss outweigh[ed] the governmental interest in
summary adjudication."' 5 Finding the balance in favor of the
welfare recipient, the Court ordered a pretermination evidentiary
hearing. The "one function" of this hearing was "to protect a
recipient against an erroneous termination of his benefits,"', and
despite the disclaimer by the Court that such a "hearing need
not take the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial trial,"' 7 the procedures it prescribed approximated those of a formal adversary
hearing. The Court required timely and adequate notice of the
hearing and the reasons proposed for the termination of benefits,
opportunity to defend by confronting adverse witnesses and by
pended on whether the court characterized the interest at stake as a right or a privilege.
The state could arbitrarily deny or take away a privilege, but the due process clause
protected rights. See, e.g., Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956); United States ex rel. Knauff
v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Dent v. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889). To circumvent this harsh doctrine, the Court eventually
developed several approaches, such as the balancing of state interests against indirect
effects on an individual's constitutional rights, in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960),
and the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions (directly burdening constitutional rights),
discussed in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). By the time of Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the Court had clearly repudiated the general principle "that
constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a
'right' or as a 'privilege.' " Id. at 374 (citing Goldberg, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 627 n.6 (1969), and Sherbert).
Van Alstyne argues that the effect of the distinction was to allow the government to
set aside personal liberties otherwise protected by the Bill of Rights or the fourteenth
amendment without having to provide justification to those benefiting from governmental largess. He quoted as an early appearance of the distinction dictum from Mr. Justice
(then Judge) Holmes' opinion in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220,
29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (1892), where the dismissal of a policeman for violating a department
regulation forbidding political comment was upheld by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts:
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in
which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free
speech, as well as of idleness, by the implied terms of the contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are
offered him.
Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CoaRzLL L. Rev. 445, 445-46 (1977).
14. 397 U.S. at 262.
15. Id. at 263 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
16. Id. at 267.
17. Id. at 266.
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presenting arguments and evidence orally, representation by legal counsel if the welfare recipient so chose, an impartial decisionmaker, and a statement of reasons for the final determina8
tion as well as a statement of the evidence relied on.1
5 a case involving
Two years later, in Morrissey v. Brewer,"
the due process requirements of parole revocation, the Court followed and more clearly delineated the two-step analysis set out
in Goldberg by first identifying the nature of the private interest
implicated, then balancing the state's interests against those of
inmates to find the appropriate amount of process due. The
Court found that a parolee had a definite and valuable, though
conditional, liberty interest in maintaining his parole and held
that this interest was within the protection of the fourteenth
amendment. 0 Significantly, the interest arose from the state's
creation of a parole system and the parolee's reliance on maintaining his liberty so long as he lived up to specified parole conditions. After balancing the parolee's interest, the state's interest
in returning a parole violator to prison without the burden of a
new trial and society's interest in rehabilitating the parolee,2 ' the
Court held that an informal, prerevocation hearing was required.2 2 As in Goldberg, the Court thereby sought to assure that
the decision would be "based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion [would] be informed by . . . accurate knowledge." 3 The Court in Morrissey also emphasized that "fair
treatment in parole revocations [would] enhance the chance of
rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness,"24 thus rec18. Id. at 268-71.
19. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
20. Id. at 482.
21. Id. at 483-84.
22. The Court set forth the following "minimum requirements of due process":
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the
parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to
present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds
good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral and detached"
hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not
be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders
as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
Id. at 489.
In a companion case to Morrissey, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), the
Court held that the same hearing requirements were applicable in proceedings to revoke
probation.
23. 408 U.S. at 484.
24. Id.
Richard Saphire points out that this quotation is one of the few references by the
Court to what he calls the "inherent dignitary values" of due process. This aspect of due
process, which he feels is essential to human dignity, "springs, not from the outcomes of
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ognizing the implementation of fair procedures as a goal in itself
apart from correctness of outcome.
Following the two-step analysis of Goldberg and Morrissey,
the Court in Board of Regents v. Roth2 5 never proceeded beyond
the first step,2" having found that a nontenured assistant professor who had brought suit against a state university, alleging that
he had been denied due process when the university had decided
without explanation not to renew his contract, had no constitutionally protectible interest in being rehired." Though the Court
recognized that Roth had a property interest in his employment,
that interest arose from his contract, a source independent of the
Constitution; thus his entitlement was limited by the terms of
that contract, which specified a one-year term.2" The court of apgovernmental decisions . .

. ,

but from the interaction between individuals and their

government that occurs as part of the decisionmaking process. .
process by which decisions are reached ....

.

.[lit is inherent in the

yet it is independent of extrinsic, substan-

tive outcomes ...." Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 111, 120-21 (1978). Saphire
suggests that "even when outcomes of decisions are viewed as unfair or unjust, the decisions may be accepted as legitimate if the processes through which they are reached respond to basic principles of self-respect and autonomy." Id. at 124. He thus stresses procedural fairness as a due process goal in itself, apart from the often exclusively
recognized goal of correct, error-free determinations.
25. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
26. Arguably, the Roth Court shifted the emphasis in due process analysis from "the
'weight' . . . to the nature of the interest at stake." Id. at 571 (emphasis in original). In
deciding whether due process protection applied in the first place, the Court in Morrissey
had looked to "not merely the 'weight.'" 408 U.S. at 481 (emphasis added). The
slight shift in Roth may reflect a passing from what one commentator refers to as the
"impact view of due process" to the "entitlement view," a shift portending a return to
the old distinction between rights and privileges. See Comment, Two Views of a Prisoner's Right to Due Process: Meachum v. Fano, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 405 (1977);
note 34 and accompanying text infra.
The author of the Comment explains that the entitlement view "rests on the notion
that the requirement of due process presupposes the existence of an independent legal
right," such as the state law creating a parole system in Morrissey or the contract right to
employment for one year in Roth. Comment, supra, at 407. The impact view, on the
other hand, "stresses not the existence of a formal legal entitlement, but the presence
...of a likelihood that [governmental] action will lead to significant adverse impact on
an [individuall," such as the grievous loss of welfare benefits, with the grievousness of
the loss depending on individual circumstances. The commentator favors the impact
view. Id. at 406-07.
27. The Court recognized broad liberty interests but held that there were none at
stake, because the university had not made "any charge against [Roth] that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community" or "imposed on him a
stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities." 408 U.S. at 573.
28. The Court stated:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather,
they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of enti-
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peals in Morrissey had similarly reasoned that because state law
provided for a parolee's return to prison at any time, a parolee
had no statutory right to remain on parole.2 But in reversing the
court of appeals, the Supreme Court did not even address that
argument.
Dicta in Roth indicated that a tenured professor at a public
university did have a constitutionally protectible interest in continued employment, 30 yet the Court in Arnett v. Kennedy3 chose
not to analogize that situation to the dismissal of a nonprobationary government employee from his position without opportunity to be heard. Instead, in a plurality opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the Court increased its emphasis on the creation
of protectible interests by sources independent of the Constitution and held that although a state statute here gave the employee an "expectancy" that he would not be fired except for
cause, the same statute prescribed the procedure by which
"cause" was to be determined.32 Thus, the "property interest"
conferred was "conditioned by the procedural limitations which
had accompanied the grant of that interest.

' 33

The Rehnquist

opinion cast considerable doubt on Goldberg as a viable precedent by appearing to make the applicability of due process safeguards depend upon the legislature's willingness to write procedural protections into the statute. 3 In fact, the language used
tlement to those benefits....
Just as the welfare recipients' "property" interest in welfare payments
was created and defined by statutory terms, so the respondent's "property"
interest in employment at Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh was created
and defined by the terms of his appointment.
Id. at 577-78.
In the companion case to Roth, Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), the Court
acknowledged that rules and mutually explicit understandings could create a de facto
tenure program apart from formal contractual tenure provisions and could thus support a
claim of entitlement to tenure.
29. 408 U.S. 471, 475 (1972).
30. 408 U.S. 574, 576-77 (1972).
31. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
32. Id. at 151-52.
33. Id. at 155.
34. Rehnquist's opinion exemplifies the "entitlement view" taken to its logical extreme. See note 26 supra. Justice Marshall, with whom Justices Douglas and Brennan
concurred, wrote in dissent that if an entitlement "could be conditioned on a statutory
limitation of procedural due process protections, . . . lilt would amount to nothing less
than a return, albeit in somewhat different verbal garb, to the thoroughly discredited
distinction between rights and privileges .... 416 U.S. at 211.
Scholars commenting on the case have voiced similar criticisms. Professor
Monaghan writes of Rehnquist's "startling" opinion:
There is probably nothing inherently illogical in this approach. "Property"
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both here and in Roth is hauntingly reminiscent of Justice (then
Judge) Holmes' opinion in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford,35
often quoted as an example of the right-privilege distinction: 3
"[tihe servant [dismissed for violating job regulations prohibittakes the employing political comment] cannot complain, as 3he
7
ment on the terms which are offered him.
Six Justices disagreed with Justice Rehnquist's analysis and
found that the property interest created by the statute warranted further independent inquiry into procedures required to
protect that interest. As Justice White said in his partial dissent,
"While the State may define what is and what is not property,
once having defined those rights the Constitution defines due
process, and as I understand it six members of the Court are in
agreement on this fundamental proposition. ' 38 Justice Powell,
may be viewed as merely a series of discrete rights and powers, the property
teacher's "bundle of sticks." And there is no a priori reason to exclude "procedural sticks" from the bundle. But our legal traditions strongly oppose this
mode of analysis. In countless contexts we distinguish between substance and
procedure . . . . Be that as it may, it is not far removed from Mr. Justice
Rehnquist's mode of thinking to conclude that an individual can have no
"substantive" property interest under state law, but at best only an interest
that certain prescribed procedures be followed.
Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405, 438-39 (1977) (footnote omitted).
Professor Saphire writes that the entitlement theory, as enunciated in cases like
Roth and Arnett, reaches a point of
"Kafkaesque absurdity," leaving little or no room for the recognition of a
zone of constitutional protection that would immunize governmentally-created property or liberty interests against arbitrary infringement. Thus, the
legislature is left free to dispense, modify, or revoke society's bounty upon
any condition it chooses or, indeed, upon no condition at all. Although substantive constitutional restrictions would still prevail, no procedural safeguards would obtain unless the legislature gratuitously included them in the
statutory scheme. As applied to liberty interests, governmental action left so
unrestrained could threaten very real and substantial physical and emotional
deprivation.
Saphire, supra note 24, at 140 (footnotes omitted).
35. 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (1892).
36. See note 34 supra.
37. See notes 13 and 34 supra. Even the circumstances of Roth, Goldberg and McAuliffe are similar, each involving the dismissal of a state employee for exercising his
right of free speech. (Roth alleged that this was the reason his contract had not been
renewed. It was not and indeed could not be proven, since the Court ruled that he was
entitled neither to a hearing nor to a statement of the university's reasons for the nonrenewal.) Justice Douglas focused his entire dissent in Arnett on this first amendment issue, writing that "[h1osing one's job with the Federal Government because of one's discussion of an issue in the public domain is certainly an abridgement of speech." 416 U.S.
at 206.
38. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. at 185.
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with whom Justice Blackmun concurred, agreed that Rehnquist's view "misconceives the origin of the right to procedural
due process":
That right is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in federal employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest,
once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards. As
our cases have consistently recognized, the adequacy of statutory procedures for deprivation of a statutorily created property interest must be analyzed in constitutional terms. 9

In Wolff v. McDonnell,41 the Court found that statutes could
also create liberty interests. Wolff involved prison procedures for
depriving inmates of "good-time credits"' as a disciplinary measure for serious misconduct. But the opinion ignored the Arnett
plurality's recognition of statutorily created interests conditioned
by procedural limitations, instead citing Powell's concurrence,42
and returned to the reasoning of Morrissey. The Court held that
since the state had created a right to good-time credits, the inmates' interest in the credit system had "real substance" and
was thus entitled to due process protection."3 The opinion did not
address the question whether the state could condition the crea39. Id. at.167 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Professor Van Alstyne criticizes this portion of Powell's opinion, since "to speak of
'such an interest, once conferred,' plainly begs the question Mr. Justice Rehnquist had
raised: What 'interest' was 'conferred'?" Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 465 (emphasis in
original). Van Alstyne explains Rehnquist's opinion as follows:
The suggestion is that as property interests are divisible interests (from fee
simple ownership down through a license at sufferance), it is only fair that a
court should look very closely to see how much property was vested in order
to be careful in determining whether any of that actually vested quantum of
property is'
sought to be taken at all. If none of the vested quantum of property is threatened by the subsequent government action, clearly the constitutional requisite of due process (as a condition of such taking) will not be
applicable.
Id. at 463 (emphasis in original). In other words, the statute conferred no interest beyond
that "exactly bounded . . .by the procedural provisions of [the statute,] the only source
giving (the interest] any substance at all." Id. at 465. Thus, there was no unconstitutional deprivation.
40. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
41. "Good-time credits" were created by Nebraska statute and could be earned by
prisoners "for good behavior and faithful performance of duties." Id. at 546 n.6. Accumulation of such credits reduced a prisoner's term of confinement.
42. Id. at 558.
43. Id. at 557. The Court thus returns to an "impact view" of due process. See Comment, supra note 26, at 423.
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tion of a liberty interest upon limited procedural protections. In
prescribing the amount of process that was due, though, the
Court settled for less than the "minimum requirements" set out
in Morrissey, because "the deprivation of good time is not the
same immediate disaster that the revocation of parole is for the
parolee,"" and the balance of interests tipped in favor of the
state.
In Goss v. Lopez,'5 the twin themes of examining the statutory creation of constitutionally protectible interests and emphasizing the flexibility of due process emerged in the area of school
disciplinary proceedings. Goss was a class action against school
officials, brought by public high school students who had been
suspended from school for up to ten days without a hearing. The
students sought a declaration that the Ohio statute permitting
such suspensions violated the due process clause. In holding that
the students had property and liberty interests that qualified for
constitutional protection, the Court reasoned, as in Wolff, that
because the state had chosen to grant children the right to an
education, and in fact required them to attend school, it could
not withdraw that right on grounds of misconduct without affording students some due process protections.' 6
The position of the Court in Wolff and Goss seemed to fall
with
the insistence in Goldberg on some kind of hearing once
in
a constitutional right to due process was found, as opposed to
the theory of interests both created and limited (thus constitutionally unprotectible) by statute set out in Roth and Arnett.
But the latter theory drew fresh support from two 1976 cases,
Bishop v. Wood'7 and Meachum v. Fano.'5
Bishop has been called "a clear signal to state courts and to
federal district courts that they are free to halt the procedural
due process revolution . . . ."" In that case, a policeman classified as a "permanent employee" 0 by a city ordinance was dismissed without the benefit of a hearing. Another ordinance pro44. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 561.
45. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
46. Id. at 574.
It is interesting that Justice Powell's dissent in Goss is "indistinguishable from Mr.
Justice Rehnquist's view in (Arnett v.] Kennedy," from which Powell had strongly dissented. Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 466; see note 34 and accompanying text supra.
47. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
48. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
49. Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 467.
50. 426 U.S. at 343.
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vided that a permanent employee could be discharged for such
reasons as substandard work, negligence or inefficiency, 5 and the
district court judge interpreted this ordinance as granting Carl
Bishop only the right to hold "his position at the will and pleasure of the city." 52 Relying on Roth, the Supreme Court reasoned
that since "the sufficiency of the claim of entitlement must be
decided by reference to state law,"53 and since under the district
court's interpretation of state law Bishop was not deprived of
any property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment,
his dismissal was lawful.
Justice White argued in dissent, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmun, that the majority rested its opinion on
a proposition that six Justices had "expressly rejected" in Arnett
v. Kennedy.5" According to Justice White, "[t]he ordinance
plainly grant[ed] petitioner a right to his job unless there [was]
cause to fire him." Once that property right vested in the employee, "the Federal Constitution, not state law, . . . [mandated] the process to be applied in connection with any state
decision to deprive him of it.""5
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 344.
Bishop v. Wood, 377 F. Supp. 501, 504 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
426 U.S. at 344.
According to the district court,
Under the law in North Carolina, nothing else appearing, a contract of
employment which contains no provision for the duration or termination of
employment is terminable at the will of either party irrespective of the quality of performance by the other party. By statute, G.S. 115-142(b), a County
Board of Education in North Carolina may terminate the employment of a
teacher at the end of the school year without filing charges or giving its reasons for such termination, or granting the teacher an opportunity to be heard.
Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971).
It is clear from Article II, Section 6, of the City's Personnel Ordinance,
that the dismissal of an employee does not require a notice or a hearing.
Upon request of the discharged employee, he shall be given written notice of
his discharge setting forth the effective date and the reasons for the discharge.
It thus appears that both the city ordinance and the state law have been
complied with.
377 F. Supp. at 504.
55. 426 U.S. at 347. The Court further held that no liberty interest was implicated
because the reasons for the dismissal were not made public and Bishop's good name and
reputation were not harmed. Id. at 348; see note 27 supra. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented from this part of the opinion, writing that the majority had "destroy[ed]
even that last vestige of protection for 'liberty' " by allowing a state to fire an employee
for an ostensibly "nonderogatory reason, and then turn around and inform prospective
employers that the employee was in fact discharged for a stigmatizing reason that will
effectively preclude future employment." 426 U.S. at 351-52.
56. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. at 357, 358-60 (discussing Arnett, 416 U.S. 134 (1974)).
57. Id. at 360-61 (footnote omitted).
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The Arnett plurality position prevailed again in Meachum
v. Fano.55 Meachum held that the due process clause did not "in
and of itself protect a duly convicted prisoner against transfer
from one institution to another," 5 even though the transfer was
predicated on prisoner misconduct and was from a medium- to a
maximum-security institution. The Court distinguished Wolff on
the ground that the liberty interest there had been created by
the state laws regarding good-time credits, whereas in Meachum
no state law conferred on prisoners a right to remain in a particular facility. 0 Thus, they had no statutorily generated liberty interest entitled to constitutional protection, and Massachusetts
did not have to hold transfer hearings."
Meachum, then, put liberty interests in the same class with
the property interests of the Roth analysis-i.e., they were created and defined exclusively by statute. In dissent, Justice Stevens criticized this reasoning:
It demeans the holding in Morrissey-more importantly it demeans the concept of liberty itself-to ascribe to that holding
nothing more than a protection of an interest that the State
has created through its own prison regulations. For if the inmate's protected liberty interests are no greater than the
State chooses to allow, he is really little more than the slave
described in the 19th century cases. I think it clear that even
the inmate retains an unalienable interest in liberty-at the
very minimum the right to be treated with dignity-which the
Constitution may never ignore.2
Because the majority did not address Morrissey, however, the
58.
59.
60.
61.

427 U.S. 215 (1976).
Id. at 225.
Id. at 226.
MeacTum is thus another example of the "entitlement view" of procedural due

process analysis. See note 26 supra. One commentator finds the "most disturbing aspect"
of the case to be its "failure to consider the broader implications of its limited view of
constitutionally protected liberty":
Meachum, if followed to its extreme, would allow the state to pass a law
granting some benefit while explicitly disapproving the extension of procedural protections when a benefit is deprived. . . .Moreover, . . . since any "entitlement" to benefits would be defined in terms of the specified procedures,
there could be no possibility of a successful due process attack. . . . Thus the
Meachum entitlement analysis places an enormous, unchecked power in the

state legislature, despite the courts' clear constitutional mandate under the
fourteenth amendment to oversee the use of state authority impinging on liberty or property interests.
Comment, supra note 26, at 416-17 (emphasis in original).
62. 427 U.S. at 233.
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question whether a constitutionally protectible liberty interest
could exist independent of state law was left open.
That issue arose in the context of parole release determinations in Greenholtz. Against the recent background of inconsistent decisions, the Court divided sharply once again. Although
the Court ostensibly adhered to the two-step analysis delineated
in Morrissey and followed in subsequent cases, the dichotomy of
available precedent enabled the majority and the dissenters to
disagree in method and value, yet arrive at nearly'the same conclusion about the proper result. It is significant that the majority
opinion by Chief Justice Burger begins by quoting from Roth
and Meachum.13 Predictably, the majority found that a parole
release proceeding implicates no liberty interest independent of
that created by state law. The dissents, on the other hand, argued that "all prisoners potentially eligible for parole have a liberty interest of which they may not be deprived without due process, regardless of the particular statutory language that
implements the parole system." 4 All the Justices agreed that
due process did not require that each inmate be afforded a formal adversary hearing 5 but disagreed about just what due process did require.
In the first step of the inquiry-i.e., whether prisoners have
a constitutionally protectible liberty interest at stake-the Court
made three points. First, convicted persons have no "inherent
right" to be conditionally released before the expiration of valid
sentences; second, administrative decisions do not "automatically invoke due process protection"; and third, the state has no
"duty" to establish a parole system.66 In responding to the inmates' argument, based on Morrissey, that "a reasonable entitlement is created whenever a state provides for the possibility of
parole," 7 the Court chose to distinguish Morrissey rather than
meet the argument head on. According to the majority, denial of
parole release and parole revocation are different, one being the
denial of a conditional liberty one desires and the other, a deprivation of a liberty one has.68 Furthermore, to grant parole the
Board must predict how the prisoner will behave, once paroled;
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Greenholtz, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2103-04 (1979).
Id. at 2111 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 2107-08, 2110-11, 2118.
Id. at 2104.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 2105.
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in revoking parole, the Board may base its decision on the facts
of the parolee's actual conduct during parole. Thus, the kind of
decision called for in each case is qualitatively different: the former is subjective and predictive; the latter, essentially objective
and factual. 9
The Court accepted the inmates' second argument, that the
language of the Nebraska parole statute created a presumption
that parole will be granted except for four specified reasons. 0
This "expectancy of release" gave rise to a constitutionally protectible entitlement requiring "some measure" of predeprivation
due process." But the majority emphasized that in construing
the parole law of any other state the Court might reach a contrary result.
Both dissents strongly opposed the reasoning that the existence of a protectible interest in parole release arose solely from
the particular language of the Nebraska statute and did not exist
69. Id. The Court saw the parole release decision as more closely akin to the highly
discretionary prison transfer decision than to revocation of parole. Citing Meachum, the
Court concluded that "the general interest asserted here is no more substantial than the
inmate's hope that he will not be transferred to another prison, a hope which is not protected by due process." Id.
70. The inmates relied on the section which provides in part:
Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed offender
who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of the
opinion that his release should be deferred because:
(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions
of parole;
(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote
disrespect for law;
(c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline; or
(d) His continued correctional treatment, medical care, or vocational or
other training in the facility will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a
law-abiding life when released at a later date.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1, 114(1) (1976), quoted in Greenholtz, 99 S. Ct. at 2106. The "presumption" that the state has created a liberty interest arises primarily from the word
"shall."
Marshall labeled the majority's analysis of the liberty interest at stake a "gratuitous
commentary," because the Court did accept the inmates' second argument and ultimately held that the Nebraska parole statute created a protectible entitlement. 99 S. Ct.
at 2111.
71. 99 S. Ct. at 2106. In effect, the Court adheres to the entitlement view of due
process. See note 26 supra.
72. We can accept respondent's view that the expectancy of release provided in
this statute is entitled to some measure of constitutional protection. However,
we emphasize that this statute has unique structure and language and thus
whether any other state statute provides a protectible entitlement must be
decided on a case-by-case basis.
99 S. Ct. at 2106.
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independently of it. Powell found the due process clause no less
applicable to parole release determination than to decisions concerning the revocation of parole or probation or the rescission of
good-time credits.73 According to Powell, once the state creates a
parole system, an inmate acquires a legitimate and protectible
expectation of parole upon fulfillment of certain conditions. 7'
Marshall's dissent, which Brennan and Stevens joined, similarly
asserted that the mere presence of a parole system creates a constitutionally protectible liberty interest, irrespective of the specific language in the state's parole statutes.7 5 Marshall elaborated: When a person is convicted of a crime, he is deprived of
this liberty interest which all individuals "normally" possess as
an inherent right rather than a statutory creation. But the existence of a parole system conditions the initial deprivation and
allows the prisoner to retain an interest in securing freedom. Because parole release proceedings implicate this retained interest,
due process requirements must be met." Marshall further declared that the majority misapplied prior decisions since neither
Morrissey nor Wolff relied upon specific terms of any statute to
find protectible liberty interests.77 As for the distinction the majority drew between parole revocation and parole release, both
Powell and Marshall averred that it has no constitutional
dimension ."
Having found that these inmates had an interest entitled to
some protection, the majority turned next to the question of how
much process was due. But the majority seemed to depart from
the usual approach at the second stage of the due process analy73. Id. at 2110.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2111-12.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2112.
78. Powell argued first that whatever difference there may be in the severity of the
disappointment resulting from a denial of release or from revocation should not be dispositive of the question whether due process requirements apply at all, which depends on
the nature and not the weight of the interest implicated. Second, unless the Board arbitrarily grants or denies parole, even subjective and predictive evaluations make use of
factual findings. Id. at 2110.
Relying on Wolff, Marshall wrote that "[wihether an individual currently enjoys a
particular freedom has no bearing on whether he possesses a protected interest in secur-

ing and maintaining that liberty." Id. at 2113. Neither does the fact that "the administrative decision may turn on 'subjective evaluations,' " id. at 2114, in any way diminish
"the interest affected by parole release proceedings," because in Morrissey, the Court had
also recognized a "subjective component" in the revocation decision. Id. at 2114-15.
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sis.78 Rather than expressly balancing the interests of inmates
against those of the state, the Court stressed the flexibility of
due process and its goal of minimizing the risk of error. Because
of the predictive nature of the parole release determination, the
Court argued, "[p]rocedures designed to elicit specific facts, such
as those required in Morrissey, Gagnon, and Wolff, are not necessarily appropriate."8 0 The additional procedural protections
(notice, a formal hearing and a summary of the evidence) ordered by the court of appeals" in this case "would provide at
best a negligible decrease in the risk of error."8 The majority
may have implicitly balanced that "negligible" interest against
the interest of the state in administrative convenience, because
the opinion prefaced this part of the analysis by noting the practical objection to requiring "burdensome and unwarranted" procedures in determining parole releases, for states might then
"abandon or curtail parole." ' In this context, the Court concluded that the Nebraska procedures satisfied constitutional
requirements.
Marshall's dissent rightly criticized the majority for "focus[ing] almost exclusively on . . . the risk of error" and failing
to engage in the traditional balancing of interests to determine
the amount of process due. 4 As to requiring more advanced notice of the hearing date and a statement of the evidence on
which the Board bases a denial of parole, Marshall suggested
that the burden those requirements would impose on the Board
is sufficiently light and the benefit they would afford inmates
sufficiently great to warrant their adoption." Powell agreed as to
the notice requirement only, because to him, "the report of the
Board's decision . . . seem[ed] adequate."" Both dissents concurred with the majority that due process does not require a for79. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); note 3 supra.
80. 99 S. Ct. at 2107.
81. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Cor. Complex v. Greenholtz, 576 F.2d 1274, 1285;
see note 11 supra.
82. 99 S. Ct. at 2107.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2116. Marshall quotes the three factors set forth by the Court in Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), then argues that by ignoring the first and third
factors "the Court skew[ed] the inquiry in favor of the Board." 99 S. Ct. at 2116.
85. 99 S. Ct. at 2116-17.
86. Id. at 2111. Powell contends that a prisoner's ability to prepare adequately for a
hearing is substantially if not completely crippled by the Board's refusal to give notice
more than a few hours in advance. Id.
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mal hearing for every determination of parole release. 7 By insisting on less than the maximum possible requirements, Marshall
sought to show that a balance of all the relevant factors called
for greater protection of an inmate's interest in parole release.
Finally, Marshall resurrected a point that Burger himself noted
in Morrissey but failed to consider here: Due process also has a
goal of preserving the "appearance of fairness and the confidence
Of inmates in the decisionmaking process." 88
However broad the implications of Greenholtz may be, the
fine factual distinctions the Court drew (particularly between
parole release and parole revocation) will provide ample opportunity for limiting the precedential value of this case. Unfortunately, by finding that no constitutionally protectible liberty interest in parole release exists independently of that created and
defined by statute, the Burger majority has added weight to the
danger posed by the Roth-Arnett-Bishop-Meachum cluster of decisions, as opposed to Goldberg and Morrissey, which had tended
to require greater procedural protections in administrative contexts. Certain language in Roth and Arnett gives rise to an "entitlement" view of due process that, taken to its logical extreme,
would allow the state not only to define the sole liberty and
property interests entitled to due process protection but also to
prescribe and limit the procedures that accompany the grant of
such entitlements. Loosely construed, Greenholtz could turn the
confused wavering of the recent due process decisions into a dangerous swing back to the old distinction between rights and privileges and to the notion that what the state gives it may also
take away.89 Lastly, the willingness of the majority to dispense
87. Id. at 2110, 2118.
88. Id. at 2117.
Marshall quotes from Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
171-72 (1951):
The validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely aepend on the mode
by which it was reached. Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and self,
righteousness gives too slender an assurance of rightness. No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy
of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it. Nor
has a better way been found for generating the feeling, so important to a
popular government, that justice has been done.
99 S. Ct. 2118.
89. See note 34 supra.
Professor Saphire writes that:
[Ilt
is difficult to understand why the Court has developed such a highly positivistic model of procedural due process. . ..
The most credible explanation is that a majority of the Justices, striving
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with a balancing approach in its analysis and concentrate on the
reduction of erroneous decisionmaking fails to give full recognition to the inherent value of procedural due process as a goal in
itself.9 0 Fair treatment takes on special significance in a prison
context because many inmates have lost their respect for and
confidence in the system. In light of the major goal of parole-to
rehabilitate prisoners-"' this consideration seems crucial. But
only if the Court limits Greenholtz to its facts can that policy
prevail.
WENDELIN

A.

WHITE

to extricate the Court from the activism of the past two decades, may be
searching for a methodology that will reduce its involvement in the more political processes of the legislative arena.
Saphire, supra note 24, at 194.
90. See note 24 supra.
91. 99 S. Ct. at 2107.

